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Abstract 
 
This paper synthesizes interrelated postulations from the systemic conflict and intergroup conflict 
theorizations to glean the societal conflict conceptual framework. The paper employs this conceptual 
framework to appraise the validity of the societal characterization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during 
the peace diplomacy era. Accordingly, the analysis uses the ‘structured, focused comparison’ qualitative 
method to investigate attitudinal and behavioral aspects of five cases of intercommunal violence within 
the Palestinian-Israeli context. The observed cumulative evidence indicates that the unresolved conflict 
has been exhibiting the conceptual properties of societal conflict throughout more than 25 years since 
the introduction of the Middle East peace process in 1991. Overall, the study explores the social, 
psychological, and political aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, accentuates the societal 
underpinnings of intercommunal violence, and provides basis for perceiving the limited success of peace 
diplomacy. 
 
Keywords: Systemic Conflict; Intergroup Conflict; Palestinian-Israeli Conflict; Societal conflict; 
Intercommunal violence 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Arab-Israeli conflict incorporates historical, strategic, ideological, and social dimensions. 
Accordingly, this conflict appears as a confrontation between Arab nationalism and Zionism (Ghali, 
2008), and involves religious dissonance between Islam and Judaism. At a cognitive level, Arabs 
and Israelis believe that tangible and nontangible factors such as military strength, Leadership, 
God’s will, and the economy determine the outcome of the conflict (Inbar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1985). 
The Arab-Israeli conflict also involves numerous issues of dispute, including the creation of a viable 
Palestinian state, the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel, the future of the 
holy city of Jerusalem, and the rights of Palestinian refugees. Additional issues involve violence and 
deteriorating living conditions in the Occupied Territories, the security of Israel, and the expansion 
of Jewish settlements in territories captured in 1967. 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict appears as a zero-sum game in which each side gains at the 
expense of the other (Stav, 2001). The conflict has exacted tremendous economic cost, and 
estimates show that peacefully solving the conflict would benefit both sides considerably (Anthony 
et al, 2015). The Middle East peace process began in 1991 to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Peace diplomacy is an elaborate enterprise that involves significant roles by the U.S. government 
(Migdalovitz, 2010). Peace diplomacy has lingered for over 27 years, but has not resolved major 
issues of dispute. 
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The research problem of this paper concerns exploring the persistence of the societal nature 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, this paper attempts to achieve the following research 
objectives: 
1. Delineating the societal conflict conceptual framework through synthesizing the systemic 
conflict and intergroup conflict theorizations; 
2. Using the societal conflict conceptual framework to interpret major empirical cases of 
intercommunal violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
Concepts facilitate conducting longitudinal and temporal comparisons (Sartori, 1984). This study 
explores the Palestinian-Israeli conflict within the societal conflict conceptual perspective, and 
assesses the relevance of this conceptualization over 25 years of peace diplomacy. The study 
hypothesizes that the societal conflict conceptualization remains applicable to describing the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict as it had been before the commencement of the peace process in 1991. 
The analysis follows the ‘disciplined’ variant of case studies (Eckstein, 1975), in which 
theoretical conceptualization guides the qualitative interpretation of empirical events. The study 
uses the ‘structured, focused comparison’ method (George & McKeown, 1985) to collect and 
analyze relevant data. This method is ‘structured’ because it emphasizes theory in the process of 
producing cumulative knowledge through systematically investigating a small number of cases. This 
method is ‘focused’ because it only considers aspects of each case pertinent to the theoretical 
postulations of the study. 
Accordingly, the analysis identifies five empirical cases of Palestinian-Israeli intercommunal 
violence, and asks the following two questions with respect each of the five cases: What are the 
attitudinal and behavioral aspects the context of the case involves? How do these attitudinal and 
behavioral aspects correspond with the conceptual characteristics of societal conflict? The analysis 
interprets answers to these questions to assess the congruence of events in each case with the 
societal conflict conceptualization. 
 
3. Societal Conflict Conceptual Framework 
 
Anatol Rapoport's theorization of adversarial relations presents the notion of ‘Us against Them’, 
and classifies ways of perceiving the opponent into three categories. The first is systemic and 
denotes ‘fights’, in which the objective is to eliminate the ‘enemy’. The second is strategic and 
represents ‘games’ where the emphasis is on analyzing the situation in order to outwit the ‘rival’, 
while attitudes towards the other side remain either neutral or friendly. The third involves ‘debates’, 
in which the intention is to convince the debating opponent rather than remove or outsmart him 
(Rapoport, 1960, 1974). 
The description of systemic conflict relates to the conceptualization of intergroup conflict.  
From social psychology standpoint, individuals define themselves and are defined by others as 
members of a group, share common emotional involvement, and achieve a degree of consensus 
about the evaluation of their group membership. Individuals acquire a sense of self-worth and 
identity from group membership, and compare between their own group and other groups (Tajfel & 
Turner, 2004). A common assumption among theories of the psychological mechanisms of 
intergroup conflicts is that humans adapt their attitudes and behaviors to markers of group 
membership (Böhm, Rusch, & Baron, 2018). 
Each society in intergroup conflict functions as a distinctive social entity in rivalry with the 
other society, and individuals in each society empathize with their fellow society members. Although 
some evidence suggests that social cohesion within the group does not always positively correlate 
with tension with other hostile group (Rabbie, 1993), mutual animosity in intergroup conflict 
generally maintains intra-group cohesion and incites hatred against the other society. Intergroup 
conflicts range between tractable and intractable types, and the latter concern goals that the two 
societies perceive indispensable for their existence, and therefore conflict tends to persist (Bar-Tal, 
2001). 
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The two conceptual perspectives of systemic conflict and intergroup conflict capture the 
underlying attitudinal and behavioral components of conflict between whole societies. This type of 
conflict involves negative interdependence between two identities to the extent that asserting the 
identity of one group requires negating the identity of the other, and each group perceives the other 
as the source of its own negative identity elements (Kelman, 1999). Social identity influences the 
formation and evolution of intergroup conflict, and religion is the most salient dimension along which 
conflict emerges (Seul, 1999). Since religion has profound implications for individuals and the 
society, religious beliefs and structures strongly shape the dynamics of hostility and aggression. 
Rapoport’s theorization of ‘Us against Them’ captures the hostility-aggression relations in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and posits that reciprocal antagonism escalates the conflict to societal levels 
that go beyond governmental institutions. Conflict in this perspective appears as intercommunal 
and existential, in which one society perceives the other as a fundamental thereat to its existence 
(Kelman, 2005). The psychological and behavioral aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict fit the ‘fight-
enemy-aggression’ categorization. Israel has refuted Palestinian nationhood and at best reduced 
the Palestinians to mere Arabs. Similarly, Arab states initially negated the right of Israel to exist and 
Muslim and Arab masses continue to reject normalizing relations with Israel. Muslim, Arab, and 
Palestinian maximalist stances advocate the destruction of the state of Israel, and Israel is mindful 
of the importance of securing its existence amidst hostile Arab and Muslim sentiments. 
Furthermore, the Arabs and the Israelis experience what Rapoport calls the ‘internalization of 
conflict’, in which notions of conflict are inculcated in individuals, culturally transmitted through 
social groups, and collectively internalized within the Arab and Israeli societies. Accordingly, conflict 
between Arab states and Israel comprises conflict predispositions at individual, group, and societal 
levels, and integrates conflict with the political, economic, and social spheres of human life. The 
result is the creation of sustainable structures of conflict, reinforced by social groups and 
transmitted through successive generations. 
Culture is an essential dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Culture plays a crucial role in 
pooling together history and belief to the effect of cultivating antagonistic political ideology. As 
Ghada Karmi explains, the clash between the Palestinians and the Israelis reflects the more 
comprehensive conflict between Arab and Jewish Weltanschauung. 
 
[O]n the Israeli/Jewish side, there is a long legacy of anti-Semitic experience and the effects of the 
Holocaust which have engendered feelings of victimization, insecurity and suspicion. Such attitudes 
have led to aggression, denial of the other side’s legitimacy and unrealistic demands for 
reassurance. On the Palestinian side there is a basic grievance against Israel’s expropriation of 
their land and their consequent dispossession. This has led to an unrelenting demand for Israel to 
acknowledge its responsibility in this matter and to make amends (Karmi, 1999:106). 
 
This complex conflict, therefore, involves societal beliefs that serve as a psychological 
infrastructure that not only helps people cope with the special demands the intractable conflict 
places on them, but also contributes to perpetuating it. There are eight such societal beliefs: the 
justness of one’s own goals, security, the adversary’s delegitimization, positive self-image, own 
victimization, patriotism, unity, and one’s own wish for peace (Bar-Tal, 1998). 
Emotions of fear, hatred, hope, and security shape individuals’ responses to conflict contexts. 
These emotions can assume group-based and collective relevance, and create the emotional 
climate and collective emotional orientation through which group and society members interpret 
conflictive and peaceful events. Therefore, negative conflict context produces an emotional climate 
that induces negative collective beliefs and emotions that lead to defensive or aggressive behavior 
(Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007). The existence of collective emotions switches focus from 
personal psychology to social psychology, and consequently justifies elevating the level of analysis 
of conflictive emotions from the individual to the societal level. 
The Palestinians are victims of a long process of systematic dehumanization, and this process 
is now at its peak because Israelis consider both living and dead Palestinians inhuman (Levy, 
2015). If the theoretical description of internalized conflict is correct, perhaps an equally belligerent 
Arab culture in relation to Israel can help explain the sympathy Palestinian militancy receives from 
Arab and Muslim publics and the tendency of the majority of the Arab and Muslim people not to 
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consider Palestinian violent activities against Israel as acts of terrorism. 
The preceding discussion shows that society members, both individuals and groups, are 
immediately relevant to the concepts of systemic conflict and intergroup conflict. The connection 
between the society and aspects of conflict and violence is structural, cultural, psychological, and 
behavioral. Therefore, it is possible to specify the following main conceptual components of the 
societal conflict framework: 
• Underlying ‘Us against Them’ social conflict context, and ‘fight-enemy-aggression’ 
antagonistic relationship; 
• Mutual sentiments of hatred and distrust between whole societies, fueled by internalized 
animosity sustained by social identity and conflict structures; 
• Conflict dispositions encompass the individual, group, and societal levels, assimilated by 
the social and political spheres; 
• Reciprocal application of physical violence against rival society, perpetrated by 
governmental and communal agents in pursuit of uncompromising stances. 
 
4. Empirical Cases of the Palestinian-Israeli Societal Conflict 
 
The societal conflict conceptualization informs the analysis of five events of intercommunal violence 
that correspond to various time intervals, four of which took place during the peace diplomacy era. 
Chronologically ordered, these are the First Intifada (1987), the Hebron Massacre (1994), the 
Second Intifada (2000), the Intifada of the Individuals (2015), and the U.S. Decision on Jerusalem 
(2018). Overall, the conceptually driven analyses show that the societal character of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict has not faded out during the peace diplomacy era. 
 
4.1 The First Intifada 
 
The First Intifada (Uprising) which erupted in December 1987 manifests the societal 
characterization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. After two decades of Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories in the aftermath of the 1967 war, the uprising erupted in the West Bank and 
Gaza as a widespread popular struggle. Indications of increased levels of interethnic violence in the 
Territories during the preceding year signaled that a crisis was developing (Ben-Yehuda & Sandler, 
2002:143). The First Intifada reflected Palestinians’ perception of Israeli disagreement over the 
occupation as an opportunity to develop a strategy of insurgency (Alimi, 2007). 
The societal nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict set two killing events as the immediate 
impetus for the Intifada. An Israeli individual was stabbed to death in Gaza and, on the next day, a 
traffic accident between a civilian car and an Israeli military vehicle in the Jabalya refugee camp 
killed four Palestinian residents. Against the background of mutual distrust and animosity, the two 
incidents created a context for believing that the four Palestinians were killed in retaliation for the 
death of the Jewish settler, and the Palestinians therefore immediately revolted against Israel in the 
occupied areas.1 
The Islamic Jihad movement mobilized Palestinian masses to dissent against Israeli 
occupation, much along the militant activism of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s. The 
Iranian Revolution showed that an effectively mobilized population could topple a powerful 
repressive political regime, even if the revolting people are unarmed and the ousted regime is 
supported by the United States (Robinson, 2004:124-5). Hamas, another movement with Islamic 
orientation, soon began directing the daily activities of the uprising. 
The Palestinians employed a mixture of civil disobedience and sub-conventional force. The 
Israeli government initially considered the situation as a typical security problem, but realized the 
serious proportions of the uprising when the latter called for a political campaign against the very 
existence of the state of Israel. Between the eruption of the Intifada and the conclusion of Oslo One 
                                                            
1 Narrative of events retrieved from: ˂http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to 1991_intifada_1987.php˃. 
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Accord on September 13, 1993, 1,100 Palestinians and 58 Israelis were killed in the Occupied 
Territories, and 17 Palestinians and 53 Israelis were killed within the Green Line.2 
Three observations are relevant for interpreting the First Intifada. First, the uprising involved 
the prolonged activism of large segments of the Palestinian society, including Palestinians of minor 
age known in mass media as ‘Children of Stones’ (Mansour, 1990). Second, the Intifada included 
the expressively Islamic religious tenets of the two Palestinian groups that provoked and mobilized 
the popular insurgence. Third, the Intifada advocated the denial of the right of the state of Israel to 
exist. Considered together, these observations clearly suggest that the Intifada was quintessence of 
the societal characterization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
 
4.2 The Hebron Massacre 
 
Less than six months after singing the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the 
Palestinians, a disturbing expression of the animosity between Jewish settlers and the Palestinians 
in the Occupied Territories served as a bitter reminder of the societal nature of the conflict. On 
February 25, 1994, Dr. Baruch Goldstein walked into al-Haram al-Ibrahimi (Tomb of the Patriarchs) 
mosque and went on a killing rampage. Reference here is to the Hebron massacre, in which the 
perpetrator — a Jewish settler affiliated with the extremist Israeli organization Kach — killed 29 and 
wounded 125 Muslim worshipers.3 
The massacre took place on Friday in the month of Ramadan. Therefore, it is difficult to 
exaggerate the religious implications of the event since the victims were performing a major Islamic 
religious duty, on a holy day in Islamic faith, in the holiest month in the Islamic calendar. 
Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim masses were deeply outraged because of the human and religious 
implications of the event. In the ensuing Palestinian riots, 25 Palestinians and 5 Israelis were killed. 
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) imposed a two-month curfew on the city, and the Israeli 
government introduced regulations to separate the city’s 500 Jews from the Palestinian population 
(Miller, 2014). 
Since both Muslims and Jews revere the Tomb of the Patriarchs, the site is a subject of the 
dichotomy between ‘usurpation’ and ‘sharing’ on how the two sides approach disputed sacred 
places. The day on which the massacre took place coincided with the festival holiday of Purim in 
the Jewish calendar, and the evening before the perpetrator was sitting with his children and other 
settler families in nearby Kiryat Arba reading the book of Esther. The holiday of Purim is supposed 
to be a day of celebration, but Goldstein may have been moved by a command in Esther, stating 
that “the Jews smote all their enemies with the sword, slaughtering, and destroying them, and did 
as they pleased to those who hated them (Esther 9:5)”. He went to the Tomb of the Patriarchs early 
the next morning to honor what he believed was a scriptural command from across the millennia 
(Paine, 1994:8). 
Then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin renounced the attacker in harsh words, but the 
Palestinians were convinced that all Israelis were responsible for his acts because they had 
continually tolerated adversarial attitudes toward Arabs. The massacre brought to the Palestinians 
memories of the cruelty of Rabin’s call in 1988 for crushing the First Intifada with “force, might, and 
beatings” (Ibrahim, 1994). The massacre caused diplomatic talks with Israel to go through a lengthy 
hiatus. It was not before the Rabin Government agreed to install measures to curb Jewish settlers' 
violence and release around two thousand Palestinian detainees that the Palestinian Authority 
agreed to resume diplomatic negotiations with Israel. 
The massacre was significant because it represented a profound religious sacrilege that fits 
the societal description of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The incident 
involved the essential ingredients of ‘Us against Them’ conflict environment, as well as the effects 
                                                            
2 Statistics concerning fatalities in the First Intifada up until the signing of Oslo One Peace Accord are obtained 
from B'Tselem records, <http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables>. 
3Different versions of the motivations behind the incidence and the number of casualties exist. This version is 
from <http://www.palestinefacts.org/prf_1991_now_israel_hebron_shooting_1994.php>. 
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of individual’s conflictive emotional involvement and adjustment to hostile group psychological cues. 
The massacre showed that signing Oslo One Accord did not provide assurances that the two sides 
were about to abandon the ‘fight-enemy-aggression’ mode of interaction anytime soon. 
 
4.3 The Second Intifada 
 
The Second Intifada (al-Aqsa Uprising) erupted on September 28, 2000, ignited by Ariel Sharon’s 
(then opposition leader) visit to al-Haram al-Sharif site, against the background of the collapse of 
the Camp David Summit in 2000 and the Palestinians’ frustration over the failure of negotiations to 
deliver a Palestinian state (BBC News, 2004). Jews know the site as Temple Mount and have 
religious claims to it, but in view of the religious significance of the site in the Islamic faith, the visit 
appeared as an infuriating desecration of a religious shrine. Muslims’ intense emotional reaction to 
Sharon’s visit to al-Aqsa Mosque instantly translated into widespread popular Palestinian outburst 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Reciprocal violence ensued and the Israeli government deployed military force to repress the 
Uprising. Palestinian militants organized a series of deadly suicide bomb attacks against targets in 
various Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv. The extensive use of this ethically problematic tactic was 
matched by a similarly controversial Israeli policy of targeted killings of Palestinian militant leaders. 
The Israeli government adopted this technique to fight Palestinian militancy shortly after Ariel 
Sharon had become Prime Minister of Israel on February 6, 2001. The policy became a subject of 
ethical assessment and international condemnation. Compared with previous applications of 
targeted killings, the large number of militant and civilian Palestinians killed during the second 
Intifada and the use of helicopters and warplanes as vehicles for the implementation of the policy 
were unprecedented (David, 2002). 
The intensity of violence and wide range of victims during the Second Intifada corresponded 
to animosity and aggression within ‘Us against Them’ perspective. Fatalities in the Territories and 
Israel resulted from Israeli military incursions into Palestinian cities and camps, the use of missile 
attacks in targeted killings in residential areas, and suicide bomb attacks in Israeli public places. 
Both Israeli security forces and Israeli civilians killed Palestinians, and Palestinians killed Israeli 
civilians and security personnel. Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants inflicted violence on 
Palestinian and Israeli children and foreign citizens.4 
Explanations of the outbreak of the Second Intifada include the competition between ‘old’ and 
‘young’ guards within the nationalist camp in Palestinian domestic politics (Shikaki, 2002), and the 
confrontation between Palestinians’ expectations over ending the occupation and the Israeli 
government's perceived interest in continuing its control over the Territories (Pressman, 2003). 
Compared with the First Uprising of 1987, al-Aqsa Uprising involved the existence of Palestinian 
structures akin to governmental institution and, to a lesser extent, different modes of violent 
engagements between rioting Palestinians and Israeli forces (Hammami & Tamari, 2001). 
Two economic considerations help explain the increased levels of violence during the Second 
Intifada. Reduced Palestinian trade with Israel in the second half of the 1990s and restrictions on 
Palestinian’s employment inside Israel at the beginning of the Intifada contributed to increasing the 
willingness of the Palestinians in the Territories to participate violently in the conflict. Additionally, 
while Palestinians’ employment in the private sector had only weakly restrained their willingness to 
participate in the conflict, employment in the public sector did not restrain Palestinians from 
participating in the violence (Cali & Miaari, 2015). 
The al-Aqsa Uprising involved significant societal conflict aspects. First, religion is a crucial 
social component of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Sharon’s visit to al-Haram al-Sharif provoked a 
major dispute in the conflict because Muslims considered it religiously irreverent and politically 
adverse. Second, the combination of Palestinian suicide attacks and Israeli targeted killings 
involved the indiscriminate killing of large numbers of civilians. The effectiveness of using either 
                                                            
4 For detailed statistics, see <http:// http://www.btselem.org/statistics>. 
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tactic in reducing the number of fatalities on one's side and achieving political objectives (Jaeger & 
Paserman, 2007) and the predictability of violence committed by the Palestinians and the Israelis 
(Jaeger &Paserman, 2008) are debatable matters. Evidently, the determined and systematic 
application of these highly violent and ethically controversial modes of inflicting fatalities 
marginalizes the value of civilian human lives. Willingness to accept the risk of causing extensive 
civilian casualties on the other side appears to fit the societal conceptualization of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. 
The Second Intifada erupted nine years after the peace process had begun, thus indicating 
the continued relevance of the societal character of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The fact that the 
Israelis and the Palestinians had used widespread and indiscriminate violence further validates the 
applicability of the societal nature of the conflict during the peace diplomacy era. 
 
4.4 The Intifada of the Individuals 
 
Also called the Knife Intifada, the Intifada of the Individuals has links to the disputed rights to 
worship at the holy Temple Mount compound. Days after Israel had captured the site in the 
aftermath of the six-day war in 1967, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan handed back keys to the al-
Aqsa mosque to the Waqf (Islamic Trust). Consequently, a status quo developed according to 
which Jews have the right to tour the Temple Mount but not pray on it, Israeli forces provide 
security, and the Waqf administers the compound. In recent years, groups committed to changing 
the standing arrangement have strongly advocated granting Jews prayer rights similar to those 
granted to Muslims. The head of the Waqf, however, believes that only Muslims have the right to 
pray at the al-Aqsa mosque (Baker, 2015). 
Hardline Jewish activists’ demands for greater access to the Temple Mount, coupled with 
right-wing politicians’ calls for rights of Jews to pray at the site have intensified concerns among the 
Palestinians that violating the status quo would result in dividing the Temple Mount. Security 
situation deteriorated significantly in July 2014 when a wave of intercommunal attacks perpetrated 
by Palestinians and Israelis erupted in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Many of the attackers had 
been influenced by postings of attacks on Facebook and Twitter, and Israel’s sophisticated 
counterterrorism measures appeared unable to confront the attackers’ objective of scaring civilian 
Israelis (Wedeman, 2015). 
The Intifada of the Individuals refers to numerous knife stabbings Arab Israeli individuals 
carried out against Israelis from September 2015 until spring 2016 in Jerusalem and within the 
Green Line. Violence also involved attacks by Jewish Israelis and use of force by the Israeli 
Defense Forces against actual and suspected Palestinian attackers. While the majority of the 
attacks were stabbings and attempted stabbings, additional forms of violence involved vehicular 
ramming, shooting, Molotov grenades, and stone throwing. 
On the Israeli side, 38 deaths and 558 injuries were recorded, and on the Palestinian side 
casualties stood at 235 deaths, 3,917 injuries, and 11,611 cases of smoke inhalations (Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The average age of Palestinians killed during the Stabbing 
Intifada was 23, and the most frequent ages of deaths were 19 and 20 years old. Sixty minor (under 
the age of 18) Palestinians were killed, including 11 children under the age of 14 and 49 children 
between the ages of 15 and 17 years old. Overall, 179 of the total Palestinian casualties were born 
around or after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. By way of comparison, the average age of 
Israelis killed during the wave of attacks was 37, and the only minor Israeli victim was 13 years old 
(Benoist, 2017). 
The Stabbing Intifada seems to have historical resonance with the anti-Jewish riots that 
erupted in September 1928 and resulted in the summer of the following year in killing 133 Jews by 
Arab rioters and 116 Arabs by British forces. Violence in both occurrences was incited by 
Palestinians’ deep desire to protect the Temple Mount from perceived Jews’ attempts to change the 
status quo of Muslim control of the holy site. In both events, Palestinian leaders actively advocated 
the notion that the Israeli government was seeking to establish permanent presence atop the 
Mount, and Muslim Palestinians rejected that Jews were indigenous to the land they believe to be 
exclusively their own (Goldberg, 2015). 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of  
Interdisciplinary Studies 
Vol 8 No 1 
March 2019 
 
 102
Young Palestinian attackers did not have previous records of links to terrorism, lacked both 
infrastructure and leadership, and used primitive weapons. However, the frequency of attacks and 
inadequacy of Israeli military measures of raids and arrests to thwart violence undermined the 
Israelis’ sense of security they painfully rebuilt after the Second Intifada (Harel, 2015). The 
attackers were contemptuous of all sources of authority, including their parents, the Palestinian 
Authority, established terrorist organizations, and Israel, and their discourse focused on basic 
human rights and ending the occupation (Ben David, 2016). 
Cynical attitudes about peace were prevalent among the Palestinians and the Israelis. A joint 
Israeli-Palestinian poll in June 2015 showed that the Palestinian and Israeli people perceived one 
another as a threat to their very existence, 56% and 43% respectively. The survey demonstrated 
that support for the two-state solution has decreased from 62% one year earlier to 51% among 
Israelis, and from 54% to 51% among Palestinians. Asked about their readiness to support mutual 
recognition after all issues of conflict are resolved and as part of final status agreements, only 44% 
of the Israelis and Palestinians expressed support, and 45% of the Israelis and 54% of the 
Palestinians opposed (Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, 2015). 
Additionally, political, economic, social, and environmental challenges attend the creation of a 
viable Palestinian state (Palestinian State Study Team, 2007), and the two-state solution involves 
conflictive issues that render it impossible (Zussman, 2018). Also, Israel seems to lack incentive to 
concede land through negotiation as opposed to espousing interest in building its reputation of 
toughness on territorial concession to deter similar claims by neighboring Arab countries, foremost 
of which is Syria (Walter, 2003). The two-state formula, therefore, can hardly alleviate the 
Palestinian’s frustration with their bleak political future. 
The attackers did not have clear affiliation with Palestinian organizations, but acted as lone 
wolves out of frustration over the continued occupation of the Territories (Ahmed, 2015). Most of 
the attacks were perpetrated by young Palestinian men and women who had sparse life 
opportunities, saw little hope in the future, and were inclined to dehumanize the Israelis because 
they had limited interaction with them. Accordingly, violence appeared intercommunal as the 
Israelis collectively viewed the Palestinians as dangerous and the Palestinians collectively viewed 
the Israelis as oppressive (Dean, 2015). 
 
4.5 The U.S. Decision on Jerusalem 
 
Jerusalem has profound significance for Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and several powers had 
historically controlled the city until Israel captured the Old City in the aftermath of the 1967 war. In 
defiance to the United Nations resolutions, Israel adopted a law on July 30, 1980 proclaiming 
Jerusalem its eternal capital (Cattan, 1981). On December 6, 2017, President Donald Trump 
formally recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and announced relocating the U.S. embassy 
from Tel Aviv (Landler, 2017). 
Trump’s decision departed from the practice of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama of using 
the presidential waiver to avoid transferring the embassy, challenged the international community’s 
stance on Jerusalem as a subject of final status peace negotiations, and possibly signaled the end 
of peace diplomacy between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Liebermann, 2017). By deciding to 
move the embassy to Jerusalem, President Trump has fulfilled his controversial campaign promise 
and endorsed Israel’s routine declaration of the Holy City as its “united and eternal” capital. He 
could have avoided smashing a long-standing consensus over the status of Jerusalem by heeding 
Arab leaders’ cautionary calls or recognizing the city as the capital of both Israel and Palestine, but 
he chose not (Black, 2017). 
President Trump’s announcement angered the Palestinians. President Mahmoud Abbas 
insisted that Jerusalem was the “eternal capital of the state of Palestine”, described the decision as 
a declaration of war against the Palestinian people, and threatened to work on “launching an 
Intifada in the face of the Zionist enemy” (BBC, 2017). Leader of militant Hamas Ismael Haniyeh 
warned that the “Zionist policy supported by the U.S. cannot be confronted unless we ignite a new 
Intifada” (The Globe Post, 2017). By threatening to call for a popular uprising, both Abbas and 
Haniyeh have alluded to the collective struggle against Zionism. Apparently, the Palestinians have 
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framed the issue within the societal conflict perspective and, therefore, threatened the incitement of 
societal violence in the dispute over Jerusalem. 
President Trump’s decision came thirty years after the outbreak of the First Intifada, and 
preventing events from escalating to violent protestations reminiscent of the levels of violence 
during the first days of that Intifada depended on how the Palestinian Authority would decide to 
proceed (Issacharoff, 2017). Immediately after the announcement, the Palestinians took to the 
streets in several cities in the Territories, and 17 people sustained light injuries in clashes with 
Israeli troops (McKernan, 2017). Less than three weeks after, 12 Palestinians died during the 
ensuing low-level violence between protesters and Israeli soldiers (The Guardian, 2017). 
While the Israelis celebrate the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, the 
Palestinians mark the occasion as al-Nakba (catastrophe) day on May 15 every year. Therefore, 
the U.S. decision to open the new embassy in Jerusalem on May 14, 2018 to coincide with the 70th 
anniversary of Israel dismayed the Palestinians (Tarnopolsky, 2018). In response, Hamas launched 
‘The Great March of Return’ to incite civilian riots along the Gaza borders with Israel on every 
Friday during the period from March 30 to May 15, 2018. 
Israel considered the protests on its borders as ‘masked terrorism’, and eight weeks of violent 
clashes between Palestinian rioters and Israeli snipers resulted in killing 100 and wounding 8,700 
Gazans (Frantzman, 2018), of which around 58 deaths and 2,700 injuries took place on the day of 
opening the new U.S. embassy (Halbfinger, Kershner, Walsh, 2018). Mass demonstrations have 
continued unabated. As of June 7, 2018, ten weeks into ‘The Great March of Return’, the number of 
Palestinian casualties reached 131 deaths and 13,900 injuries (OCHA, 2018a). As of September 6, 
179 Palestinians and 1 Israeli were killed, and 19,014 Palestinian and 37 Israeli were injured 
(OCHA, 2018b). 
The proposition of two autonomous states to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has existed 
for decades, with West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of 
Palestine. President Trump’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, however, devastates 
this proposition by giving the Israelis false hope and adding to the Palestinians’ anguish 
(Barenboim, 2017). The decision to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Israel and move the U.S. 
embassy to Jerusalem preempts the future Palestinian state, threatens to award Israel all of 
Jerusalem, and conforms to Israel’s attempts to extend its civilian sovereignty to the West Bank in 
preparation for annexing it (Cook, 2018). The Palestinians continue to find themselves a stateless 
society after seventy years of the establishment of the state of Israel, and their desperation about 
their circumstances has made clashing with Israeli soldiers and walking through live ammunitions a 
viable option (Toles, 2018). Largely, the U.S. decision on Jerusalem upsets the Palestinians’ 
potential for establishing their own state and, therefore, threatens to make their statelessness 
permanent. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has outlined the societal conflict conceptualization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
using two interrelated theorizations. First, systemic conflict involves ‘fight-enemy-aggression’ 
relationships within ‘Us against Them’ contexts that promote internalized animosity and use of 
physical violence. Second, intergroup conflict implies mutual conflict dispositions at the individual 
and collective levels, nurtured through shared emotional involvements and individuals’ 
psychological adaptation to markers of group membership. 
The societal conflict framework captures the social essence of the conflict between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, and using it to investigate major episodes of intercommunal violence 
demonstrates the analytical merits of employing theoretical conceptualization to guide qualitative 
enquiry. Specifically, the societal conflict conceptual framework placed empirical conflictive 
interactions between the Palestinian and Israeli societies within a relevant theoretical context, and 
facilitated disciplined analysis of otherwise disparate sets of facts and events. Additionally, the 
‘structured, focused comparison’ method this paper used has endeavored to produce cumulative 
knowledge through systematically estimating the level of congruence between theoretical 
postulations and observed empirical evidence in a small number of case studies. 
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The conceptually-driven analysis of the lingering Palestinian-Israeli conflict informed the 
endeavor to interpret attitudinal and behavioral information pertaining to five major events of 
intercommunal violence. In doing so, the analysis considered the psychological, social, and political 
aspects of the conflict. Through accumulating corroborating evidence across cases of 
intercommunal Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the analysis has shown the continued validity of the 
societal conflict character during the peace diplomacy era. The conceptualization of societal conflict 
seems to find validation throughout two-and-a-half decades of peace diplomacy. Accordingly, in 
spite of more than 25 years of peace diplomacy, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict retains the attitudinal 
and behavioral qualities conjunctly suggested by the systemic conflict and intergroup conflict 
theorizations. 
The Middle East peace diplomacy has been a major enterprise that contracted the active 
participation of major international and regional powers and commanded extensive political, 
diplomatic, and economic resources. However, diplomacy cannot meaningfully address this conflict 
without adequately understanding its theoretical underpinnings; hence, the importance of placing 
the conflict within the relevant societal context. The option of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict through military confrontations is neither possible nor desirable. Diplomacy is the only viable 
option to arrive at a workable settlement of the conflict. Since all major issues of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict remain unresolved against a background of troubled peace diplomacy, inquiry into 
the societal essence of the conflict occasions considering the implications of the limited success of 
diplomacy and invites creative thinking to surmount the obstructive nature of the conflict. 
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